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Abstract: This article considers the impact of Brexit on the future of Social 
Europe. Through recourse to key moments in the history of European social 
integration, where Britain more often than not vehemently opposed any coming 
together, its role as an important veto player in EU social policy-making is 
established. With the UK set to leave the Union, the option for further social 
integration is no longer inconceivable. It is featured as one of the possible scenarios 
in the Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe, and recent 
developments, such as the European Pillar of Social Rights, together with its 
accompanying initiatives appear to lay the groundwork towards that. The article 
concludes that although the realisation of Social Europe is more likely post-Brexit, 
there are other Member States willing to take over the UK’s role and act as veto 
players on their own terms. 
Keywords: Brexit; European Union; social integration; Social Europe; veto player 
1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) has not traditionally been an ally of Social Europe. Any 
support ensued after giving up fierce resistance, either subsequent to change in domestic 
party politics or, as a price to pay for gaining advantage from other measures that came 
as part of an overall package. Those measures were almost always linked to a liberal, 
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economic and free-market oriented paradigm, which the UK framed as the essence of its 
European Union (EU) membership. Mainly, the UK faced the social dimension of EU 
integration, with disgruntlement and wariness, increasingly so during the period 
preceding the Brexit referendum. This is said to contribute, at times significantly, to the 
pro-Leave majority. Now that the UK is set to leave the Union, will its social dimension 
finally draw level with its economic one? 
Social Europe had been in a stalemate until recently, despite the Lisbon Treaty’s 
proclamation of the social market economy as a key paradigm for the Union. At the same 
time, the global economic and financial crisis’ aftermath is still lingering. The resulting 
anti-austerity narrative, calling for a reorientation of the EU’s agenda, might, together 
with the UK’s departure, act as a key catalyst, as epitomised by Juncker’s pledge for a 
more Social Europe following his 2014 election as Commission President. The unveiling 
of the European Pillar of Social rights, accompanied by social policy consultations and 
proposals, demonstrates accelerated momentum. The departure of a persistent objector 
might enable the Union to finally move forward. 
The article’s key aim is to test the hypothesis that Britain’s departure would 
strengthen the social dimension of EU integration. To do so, it employs an analytical 
framework rooted in the political science theory of veto player, coined by Tsebelis in 
1995.1 By looking at the structure and evolution of EU social policy-making, and through 
recourse to key moments where progress towards further social integration was stalled 
due to the UK’s opposition, the paper establishes Britain’s role as a veto player on the 
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basis of three grounds: ideology (1), party politics and Euroscepticism (2), and external 
interference (3). It then proceeds to present the policy change that a veto player’s 
departure would prompt in relation to current policy development indicated by the 
Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe (specifying an aspect of the White 
Paper on the Future of Europe) and the European Pillar of Social Rights alongside 
accompanying initiatives. Their viability is ascertained in light of the UK’s departure, 
with reference to European Scrutiny Committee reports and other pertinent UK 
Government documents in order to substantiate observations on the British position 
towards these initiatives. The latter will allow to assess whether Brexit will have an 
emancipatory outcome for Social Europe, as a key veto player is set to leave. Following 
that, the key constraints to the afore-mentioned position are analysed based on other 
Member States’ attitudes toward the social dimension of EU integration, to show that 
whilst the British departure might give social integration a push, there will be other 
obstacles that can impede the realisation of a truly social Social Europe. 
2. The UK as a veto player 
2.1 The veto player theory as an analytical framework 
The veto player theory made its initial appearance in two pivotal comparative politics 
studies of the early 1990s, which used terms such as “veto points” or “constitutional 
structure”.2 Interestingly enough both studies were focused on social policies developed 
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in national settings. They investigated the influence of the power dynamics between 
different institutional and political actors on the decision-making processes and resulting 
policy outcomes. As Immergut argued ‘welfare state programs […] are not simply the 
product of long-term social and political trends; such programs have been introduced in 
steps, through discrete instances of legislative conflict’.3 It is not only the underpinning 
ideologies in a country’s society and governing political elite that leave their mark on 
social policy development, but also the end product of the law-making processes in which 
compromises are sought between actors with various competing interests.  
While these discussions were significant in providing a new perspective on the 
policy-making discourse, Tsebelis’s seminal work conceived the notion of “veto player” 
and introduced it into the dictionary of political science. According to him, ‘a veto player 
is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for policy decisions’.4 
The flexibility and adaptability of the concept to different systems and settings, including 
supranational institutions,5 led to a plethora of applications in an array of diverse ways 
                                                 
John Stephens, ‘Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the 
Welfare State’ (1993) 99(3) The American Journal of Sociology 711. 
3  Ellen Immergut, (n 2) 32. 
4  George Tsebelis, (n 1) 293.  
5  Mark Hallerberg, ‘Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional 
Effectiveness’ in Thomas König, George Tsebelis and Marc Debus (eds.) Reform Processes 
and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies (Springer 
2011) 24-25. 
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and scenarios.6 This article engages with the axiomatic use of the veto player theory,7 
drawing on its pre-existing application to EU level policy-making8 and makes reference 
to the key moments of UK opposition towards furthering Social Europe, in order to test 
the hypothesis that Brexit will favour a stronger EU social dimension.   
2.2 Veto Players at EU level 
Veto player theory, though initially conceived through comparative studies of national 
policy-making was soon used to analyse dynamics of EU policy-making by Tsebelis 
himself. He concluded  that up to the introduction of the Single European Act in 1987, 
each Member State was an autonomous veto player; this still applies in areas that require 
unanimity for EU legislation and as regards Treaty revisions, which require ratification 
by all Member States (Article 48 TEU).9 Post-1987, with the gradual introduction of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council and the expansion of co-legislation of 
Council and Parliament in today’s ordinary legislative procedure, many EU decision-
making processes are now imbued by the presence of collective veto players, found in the 
amalgamations of the key institutions.10  
                                                 
6  Steffen Ganghof, ‘The empirical Uses of Theoretical Models: The Case of Veto Player 
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7  Ibid,  
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9  George Tsebelis, ‘Lessons from the Greek crisis’ (2016) 23(1) Journal of European Public 
Policy 25, 39. 
10  George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press 
2002). 
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While as autonomous veto players Member States can independently block 
reforms, as collective veto players they need to forge coalitions with other Member States  
to advance or veto policy proposals11 through avoiding or achieving blocking minorities, 
as well as influencing voting in the Parliament. EU policy-making thus requires  finding 
allies among countries and politicians sharing the same vested interests, underpinning 
ideologies and/or policy preferences. In many areas, including social policy, unanimity 
remained important post-1987 for EU legislation, and it is still required for extending the 
social dimension through Treaty reform.12 The individual role of a Member State as veto 
player thus retains its relevance for the social dimension of EU integration.  
2.3 The UK as a Veto Player in EU Social Policy-making 
This section showcases the numerous instances where EU social integration was rejected 
by the UK government. Since 1973, when the UK became an EU Member State, Labour 
and Conservative governments have succeeded each other in power, and a Conservative 
– Liberal Democrat coalition government was in charge between 2010-2015. Inevitably, 
this means that different governments, at different points in time rejected some of the 
reforms for different reasons. This section groups the British grounds of veto in three 
categories: (1) rejections due to the ideological underpinnings of the ruling party, (2) 
rejections due to internal party politics and the diffusion of embedded-Euroscepticism 
                                                 
11  Herman Lelieveldt and Sebastiaan Princen, The Politics of the European Union (CUP 2011). 
12  The Single European Act, introduced QMV in the area of health and safety of workers, but 
not in others. Niklas Bruun and Bob Hepple, ‘Economic Policy and Labour Law’, in Bob 
Hepple and Bruno Veneziani (eds.) The Transformation of Labour Law in Europe: A 
Comparative Study of 15 Countries 1945-2004 (Hart 2009) 48. 
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and (3) rejections due to concerns about external interference. Whilst there is unavoidably 
some overlap between the reasons behind the vetoing of social reforms at EU level, and 
all three groupings are in a way manifestations of scepticism over Social Europe, the 
categories were coined on the basis of the key reason underlying each rejection. 
2.3.1 Ideological Rejections  
This section is almost exclusively dedicated to vetoes by the Conservative party, fuelled 
by a liberal ideology and a strict commitment to shielding the British liberal social model 
from any pro-welfare initiative.13 Whilst Labour also rejected aspects of EU integration, 
for example in campaigning for the 1975 referendum, their ideological orientation called 
for the outright rejection of EU integration based on its economic roots, supported by an 
anti-market sentiment on behalf of most trade unions, which did not translate to 
                                                 
13 According to leading typologies on the varieties of capitalism and the worlds of welfare 
capitalism, the UK had the majority of the characteristics pertaining to a liberal market 
economy, or a liberal welfare state respectively (Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton University Press 1990); Peter Hall and David Soskice, 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (OUP 
2001). Nonetheless, it has been argued that during periods of Labour-led governments such 
characteristics were weakened to make room for collectivist elements, which were once again 
attacked during the more recent Coalition government. (Damian Grimshaw and Jill Rubery, 
‘The end of the UK’s liberal collectivist social model? The implications of the coalition 
government’s policy during the austerity crisis’ (2012) 36(1) Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 105). 
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ideological opposition to EU social reforms.14 The Conservative party’s ideology did not 
conflict with the initially predominantly economic nature of the European project: the 
Treaty of Rome left social matters to the Member States, despite the momentum building 
during the Paris negotiations in the 1950s, in an arrangement modelled after the 
‘embedded liberalism’ paradigm.15 This allowed the Heath government to negotiate the 
British accession to the block in 1972.  
A resurgence of Social Europe in the 1970s did not face British opposition, whose 
Labour government was able to nominate the  Commission’s Director-General for Social 
Affairs, Michael Shanks.16 The 1980s proved more tremulous:  the  Thatcher government, 
elected in 1979, adhered to a liberal agenda and vetoed any legislative proposals, e.g. 
directives covering the rights of fixed-term and part-time workers, or parental leave.17 
The Thatcher government embraced the Single Market project, perceiving it as supportive 
of the market liberalisation it aspired for the UK. It opposed any social initiative that 
could undermine competitiveness, and the welfare state retrenchment that was underway 
in Britain.18 It was also thought that having to comply with EU social legislation, would 
                                                 
14  David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (MacMillan, 1996) 107. 
15  Dagmar Schiek, ‘Towards More Resilience for a Social EU – the Constitutionally Conditioned 
Internal Market’ (2017) 13(4) European Constitutional Law Review 611, 615-617. 
16  Michael Shanks, ‘The Social Policy of the European Communities’ (1977) 14(4) Common 
Market Law Review, 375. 
17  Jeff Bridgford and John Stirling, ‘Britain in a social Europe: industrial relations and 1992’ 
(1991) 22(4) Industrial Relations Journal 263.  
18  Robert Geyer, Andrew Mackintosh and Kai Lehmann, Integrating UK and European Social 
Policy: The Complexity of Europeanisation (CRC Press 2005). 
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increase bureaucratisation and impose additional regulatory burdens to the employers’ 
business plans.19 
Under such circumstances the introduction of QMV by the Single European Act 
(1987) had limited impact on European Social Policy in the years immediately following 
its adoption:  QMV was extended in the social field only to the area of health and safety 
of workers, 20 leaving unanimity as the rule in the rest of the social arena. This was a 
concession to the British position.21 Moreover, in the mid-1980s, various stakeholders 
                                                 
19  In relation to the nexus between decrease in working standards in the UK during the Thatcher 
era and its opposition to protective measures: Alasdair Blair, John Leopold and Luchien 
Karsten, ‘An Awkward Partner? Britain’s Implementation of the Working Time Directive’ 
(2001) 10(1) Time & Society 63, 65. Further discussion on the deregulation of employment 
laws during the 1980s: Simon Deakin ‘Equality under a market order: the Employment Act 
1989’ (1990) 19 Industrial Law Journal 1. Although the election of the conservative Kohl 
government, with its liberal tendencies, in Germany in 1982 also contributed to the stalemate, 
its position was arguable more accommodating compared to their British peers. Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Choice For Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Cornell University Press, 1998). 
20  The resurgence in the area of health and safety of workers only happened in the late 1980s-
early 1990s, and this was among the very few aspects of the envisaged European social area 
where legislatives initiatives actually materialised. For more seet: Bob Hepple ‘The Crisis in 
EEC Labour Law’ 16(1) Industrial Law Journal 77; Karen Anderson, Social Policy in the 
European Union (Palgrave 2005).  
21  Linda Hantrais, ‘Assessing the Past and Future Development of EU and UK Social Policy’ 
(2018) 17(2) Social Policy and Society 265, 270. 
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prompted a reorientation of the Community’s priorities, by criticising the solely economic 
nature of the 1985 internal market programme, which -perhaps unsurprisingly – had been 
drafted under the direction of Lord Cockfield, a Conservative Commissioner from the 
UK.  
The criticisms resulted in the subsequent adoption of various working papers 
pushing for a stronger social dimension at EU level, with proposals in the areas of health 
and safety of workers, employee participation, and benefits for those that exercise their 
free movement rights.22 The proposals came to a crescendo with the adoption of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, in December 1989, 
which nonetheless, was fiercely opposed by the UK, contributing to the final document’s 
non-binding nature, and, thus, weak influence over the establishment of concrete and 
justiciable labour rights.23  
At the end of the 1990s, the next obstacle to Social Europe by the UK was 
observed in the talks for the Charter of Fundamental Rights, during which Britain opposed 
a comprehensive inclusion of social rights.24 Interestingly enough, this was instigated by 
a Labour government, which initially displayed a constructive approach to EU policy-
                                                 
22  HG Mosley, ‘The social dimension of European integration’ (1990) 129(2) International 
Labour Review 147, 154-157. 
23  SJ Silvia, ‘The Social Charter of the European Community: A Defeat for European Labor’ 
(1991) 44(4) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 626. 
24  Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 
European Constitutional Law Review 375. 
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making with the endorsement of the Social Chapter in 1997.25 Of course, this was not just 
any Labour government, but the one crafting the paradigm-change to New Labour, 
abandoning a quasi-socialistic ideology in favour of market economics. Thus, the social 
policy choices at EU-level made initially by Labour faded away over time, coinciding 
with the erosion of the party’s social-democratic heritage under the Third Way paradigm, 
normatively bridging social and market policies, but in practice veering to the anti-
welfare, neoliberal discourse of the right.26  
2.3.2 Internal Party Politics and Eurosceptic rejections 
This persistent hostility by the British authorities to the strengthening of Social Europe 
cannot be attributed solely to the conservative government of that time, but also to the 
Euroscepticism towards the reach of EU law that prevailed even among Labour 
politicians and trade unionists, preventing any support for a change of approach.27 The 
Conservative Major government of 1990 softened the UK’s stance towards the EU, yet 
retaining the former position towards Social Europe. Rifts in the Conservative party 
around the Thatcher legacy affected the acceptance of enhanced social policy provisions 
                                                 
25 Simon Bulmer, ‘New Labour, New European Policy? Blair, Brown and Utilitarian 
Supranationalism’ (2008) 61(4) Parliamentary Affairs 597. 
26  Paul Smith, ‘New Labour and the commonsense of neoliberalism: trade unionism, collective 
bargaining and workers' rights’ (2009) 40(4) Industrial Relations Journal 337. 
27  Bob Hepple, ‘The Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights’ 
(1990) 53(5) Modern Law Review 643. 
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at EU level in particular. As a result, Major had no choice but to reject the Social Chapter 
proposed for the Treaty of Maastricht as a substantive policy change.28   
The British opt-out of the Social Chapter led to its displacement as an Agreement 
on Social Policy, annexed to the Treaty as a Protocol.29 This instance represents a good 
example of the ‘exploitation’ by the UK side of the unanimity required for Treaty reform, 
and therefore of its power as a veto player therein post-1987. Only in 1997, when Blair’s 
New Labour government came to power in the UK, the opt-out was reversed and the 
Social Chapter was finally included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. This enabled the EU to 
better involve the social partners and to more comprehensively tackle policy fields such 
as working conditions and labour market activation. UK opposition in another area 
requiring unanimity, that of equality under the then Article 141 EC, led to redirecting the 
planned Pregnant Workers Directive towards the competence base of health and safety of 
workers, which provided for QMV, but required to withdraw the aspects not related to 
health and safety.30   
The emergence of Euroscepticism as the new trend within the Conservative Party 
was fuelled by Cameron’s utilitarian view of the EU as something desirable as long as its 
benefits outweigh its costs. Cameron displayed enmity and discontent with the widened 
scope of integration, and in particular the extended influence on the sphere of social 
                                                 
28  Anthony Forster, Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations (Palgrave 1999). 
29  David Baker and Pauline Schnapper, Britain and the Crisis of the European Union (Palgrave 
2015). 
30  Roberta Guerrina and Annick Masselot, ‘Walking into the Footprint of EU Law: Unpacking 
the Gendered Consequences of Brexit’ (2018) 17(2) Social Policy & Society 319, 323. 
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policy.31 Welfare benefits for EU citizens that exercised their free movement rights were 
particularly targeted. That resurgence of the anti-welfare Eurosceptic rhetoric, brought 
the UK back as an active veto player. This time it was not content to only veto, but strove 
to abandon existing - and already agreed to - levels of integration.  
With the pledge for an EU Referendum to please the anti-EU side of the 
Conservative party, and his subsequent win in the elections making it happen, Cameron 
further pushed Europe to water down the reach of welfare benefits for EU migrants in the 
text of the so-called “EU Reform Deal”.32 The looming referendum arguably motivated 
the CJEU in Commission v. United Kingdom to backtrack its jurisprudence - and 
consequently the social acquis on social security benefits, in order to accommodate the 
UK’s pre-referendum demands.33 But the result of the referendum favoured the exit from 
the EU project over any concessions on certain, partly social policy-related aspects of 
that. 
This rejection of the acquis communautaire was also shared by circles within the 
Labour and Liberal Democrats. After all, their overarching stance throughout the last 
decade was that of a wary, half-hearted embracement of the European project, pegged on 
                                                 
31 Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton, ‘Farewell Britannia? ‘Issue Capture’ and the Politics of 
David Cameron's 2013 EU Referendum Pledge’ (2014) 52(1) Journal of Common Market 
Studies 74. 
32  Anita Heindlmaier and Michael Blauberger, ‘Enter at your own risk: free movement of citizens 
in practice’ (2017) 40(6) West European Politics 1198. 
33  Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:436. Further 
discussion in: Charlotte O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v. 
United Kingdom’ (2017) 54(1) Common Market Law Review 209. 
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the UK’s prevailing national interests, something that outside the peculiar domestic 
context of Britain could even amount to soft Euroscepticism when compared to the 
political discourse of their West European peers.34 
2.3.3 External Interference Rejections 
Arguably, most rejections to social integration at EU level could be grouped under the 
aegis of the first two categories, given the perseverance of their underlying reasons. 
Nonetheless, a moment in the not so distant past merits its own categorisation under the 
banner of rejections of external interference. As a continuation of its neoliberal turn 
described above, the New Labour, to appease concerns that were expressed in relation to 
an increase in the external influence of the EU on the UK legal order, vouched to secure 
an opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in light of its binding force with the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.35 
The UK government presented with much fanfare that it managed to secure an 
opt-out in protocol 30 annexed thereto, which was still linked to demurs over the 
justiciability of the rights enshrined in the Charter’s Solidarity Chapter, and the fear of 
creeping EU interference.36 Yet what was presented as an opt-out was an opt-out in name 
                                                 
34  Isabelle Hertner and Daniel Keith, ‘Europhiles or Eurosceptics? Comparing the European 
policies of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats’ (2017) 12(1) British Politics 63. 
35  Catherine Barnard, ‘The ‘Opt-Out’ for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?’ in Stefan Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds.) The 
Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008). 
36  Steve Peers, ‘The ‘Opt-out’ that Fell to Earth: The British and Polish Protocol Concerning the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 12(2) Human Rights Law Review 375. 
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only. The Select Committee commented that it represented more of a clarification on the 
horizontal scope of the Charter and a reaffirmation of the fact that it does not extend the 
EU’s competences to the UK, than a declaration that the UK is not bound by its 
provisions.37 
In any case the fact remains that while for a left-wing party such as Labour, it was 
almost preordained to adopt and follow more easily a pro-social agenda, even when 
‘imposed’ by the EU, the fact that it was this supranational body that instigated the policy 
change, had the ability to shift the focus of national debates from the traditional notions 
of left and right to other antithetic pairs such as centre-periphery, national-supranational, 
us-them.38 External interference was somewhat vilified in these debates, and in order to 
remain in power, the New Labour had to find a way to tame the emerging national 
concerns. 
3. Brexit’s Potential for Social Europe 
Through the milestones presented in the previous section, the UK could be perceived as 
a vivid veto player, impeding progress in the realisation of Social Europe, its rejections 
centred around three cores. To put the potential significance of Brexit in context, it is 
useful to note Tsebelis’s observation that ‘if a veto player with significant differences 
enters or leaves […], important policy changes will follow’.39 This implies that Brexit 
                                                 
37  Catherine Barnard, (n 35). 
38  Katerina Linos, ‘How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States? 
Evidence From Compliance With European Union Directives’ (2007) 40(5) Comparative 
Political Studies 547, 564. 
39 George Tsebelis, (n 1) 314. 
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may signal a watershed moment for Social Europe. The matrix of collective veto players, 
prominent at EU level, is likely to be shaken upon the UK’s departure, thus altering the 
output of the Union’s institutions to reflect a more pro-welfare line, once the most 
prominent veto player would no longer be part of the block.40 It became clear from the 
preceding analysis, that the UK in the European social arena had most of the 
characteristics of a significantly divergent Member State in this respect. Britain’s inability 
to influence the debate on Europe’s future post-Brexit might act as a liberating event for 
the EU. 
Nevertheless, adopting a more social stance may not be the only option forward 
for the EU, as demonstrated by the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe 
of 1 March  201741 with its five different scenarios: maintaining the status quo b, focusing 
solely on the Single Market, shaping coalitions within a multi-speed Europe, enhancing 
progress in certain areas whilst leaving others behind, and, lastly, integrating further.42 
The White Paper’s core function was to test the waters by expressing in very general 
terms potential directions for the EU, in the light of its 60th anniversary and the impeding 
trigger  of Article 50 TEU by the UK. While social considerations were briefly mentioned, 
the White Paper’s inherently broad nature meant that all specifications were left to five 
                                                 
40  George Tsebelis, ‘Veto Players and Institutional Analysis’ (2000) 13(4) Governance 441. 
41  European Commission, ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe’ COM (2017) 2025.  
42  Ibid 15-25.  
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more focused reflection papers,43 among which the Reflection Paper on the Social 
Dimension of Europe of 26 April 2017,44 showcasing the importance the EU institutions 
placed on the Union’s social aspirations. This should come as no surprise after Juncker’s 
2014 speech which introduced the new position of Vice-President for the euro and social 
dialogue, and pledged for a social triple-A rating for Europe, of equal importance to the 
economic and financial one.45 The social is clearly featured as one of the Commission’s 
–and consequently the Union’s- key priorities nowadays. While the Reflection Paper 
makes no reference to Brexit, the fourth chapter’s heading “a possible way forward for 
the EU 27” indicates that the UK’s withdrawal was considered  in its drafting.  
The Reflection Paper aims  to ‘galvanise Europe’s social spirit’,46 by seeking to 
map out the possible avenues for this to be translated in EU actions. It kicks off by 
presenting the different views on the current state of Social Europe, followed by its 
ongoing and future challenges. These pave the way for the diverse resolutions that are 
presented as alternatives therein. Due to the nature of the Reflection Paper as a follow up 
to the White Paper on the Future of Europe, it incorporates a table addressing the 
                                                 
43  The other four being the Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation, the Reflection Paper 
on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, the Reflection Paper on the Future 
of European Defence, and the Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances.  
44 European Commission, ‘Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe’ COM (2017) 
206. 
45  Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘Time for Action – Statement in the European Parliament plenary 
session ahead of the vote on the College’ (Strasbourg, European Parliament plenary session) 
< http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-1525_en.htm> accessed 3 January 2018. 
46  European Commission (n 44) 3. 
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consequences of the White Paper’s five scenarios for Social Europe.47 Notwithstanding 
that, moving forward, it groups the possible outcomes for the social dimension of Europe 
into three categories: a limited Social Europe as a side-note of free movement, a multi-
speed Social Europe, or, a further integrated one among the EU 27.48  
The first option presented is that of scaling back and stripping down of the social 
acquis to only those aspects that are vital to free movement. In this vision, the social 
dimension is anything but, becoming instead a facilitator of free movement of persons. 
Such a functionalist approach departs from the EU citizens qua citizens approach and the 
enhanced levels of social integration that –should- come with it, drifting back into the EU 
citizens qua economic actors dogma.49 In the latter, there is  only space for rules on the 
transferability of social security contributions and health care coverage, or the 
simplification of the posting of workers.50 Any substantive social development, such as 
the right to paid annual leave, the framework on employee consultation, the regulation of 
health and safety in the workplace, the minimum standards for temporary agency and 
part-time work and the Open Method of Co-ordination in the area, could all be easily 
sacrificed on the altar of free movement and deregulatory gains.51  
                                                 
47  Ibid 23. 
48  Ibid 24-31. 
49  Eleanor Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union. Barriers to Movement 
in their Constitutional Context (Kluwer 2007). 
50  European Commission (n 44) 26. 
51  Ibid.  
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Ultimately, the aim of this scenario is to tackle concerns over the bureaucratisation 
of the internal market, the single most important thing the EU has to offer according to 
some, a position long shared by the UK.52 This position, if proclaimed, would also 
vindicate the more deterministic views on Social Europe, which see the latter as almost 
always subordinate to the European economic constitution, rendering the national level 
the sole playing field for any deeper social dimension to take place.53 The position, apart 
from appeasing the UK demands, should the country wishes to remain a Member State, 
is problematic for two reasons. First, the market-first thesis, also articulated by the Court 
of Justice of the EU in the Laval Quartet,54 is gradually giving way to more balanced 
worldviews in the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis.55 Second, the 
laws and measures threatened with extinction under this scenario have been less 
problematic in practice, compared to those that are to be retained; the saga surrounding 
the regulation of posted workers is a good example of that. Thus, the viability of this 
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option is questionable, and becomes even more so in light of Brexit: if the UK, which 
even contemplates rescinding limitations of working time,56 leaves the EU, it is difficult 
to imagine that the remaining Member States retain the impetus for such ambitious 
deregulation of basic social rights. Even if they did, then there would be no social policy 
for the remaining Member States and/or institutions to act as veto players in. The 
Commission also appears rather dismissive of this scenario, establishing in the Reflection 
Paper that its negatives outweigh any potential benefits.57 
The second scenario of the Reflection Paper depicts a situation not much different 
to the current one. Thus, according to it, minimum standards of protection would remain 
the norm, with the mechanism of enhanced cooperation open to groups of Member States 
that wish to do more in the field.58 It is a tad paradoxical that the possibility for willing 
Member States to boost their social policies together under enhanced cooperation is 
presented as something novel by the Reflection Paper. After all, the notion of Europe à la 
carte has been trending since the 2000s, as a process that allows for different responses 
by separate groups of like-minded Member States to emerge.59  
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It seems though, and the emphasis placed on that matter in the Reflection Paper 
makes it clear, that the inclusion of this scenario is laid out as a possible remedy to the 
social deficit within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was exacerbated 
during the years of the crisis.60 It alludes to the inherently asymmetric structure of the 
EMU, which shows a Europe veering to a neoliberal, primarily economic model with just 
an atrophic social side attached to it.61 These asymmetries, not limited to but particularly 
connected to the EMU, have led to deterministic accounts highlighting the impasse the 
EU is faced with when enacting policies to ‘socialise’ the landscape.62  Indeed, any efforts 
to enhance the social dimension of the EMU based on soft integration through Europe 
2020 and the European Employment Strategy have not been very successful, calling for 
more concrete legally binding measures as the way forward.63 The enhanced cooperation 
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proposed by the Reflection Paper appears to fit these criteria, despite the -similar to the 
first scenario- danger of a race to the bottom and regulatory divergence between the 
Eurozone members and the rest of the EU. In terms of potential vetoes by the Member 
States, then differentiated integration could lead to coming together solely of those 
wishing to advance the social acquis, with veto players arising in concentrated cases of 
reforms that would de facto affect a group of countries, for example those of the eurozone. 
Nonetheless, the differences between EMU and non-EMU members might not be 
as great as they first appear to be. Studies have shown that in terms of social expenditure 
the patterns between Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States during the crisis did not 
differ significantly, exhibiting a form of peer pressure for retrenchment throughout the 
Union.64 Scharpf speculates that only an EU-wide crisis shaking up the current 
institutional framework could remedy the inherent asymmetries that overshadow social 
integration;65 in that regard, Brexit could play the role of such a wake-up call.  
Yet, if Brexit is to instigate radical change at EU level, it is not difficult to imagine 
a path departure from the well-worn regime of the second scenario in relation to Social 
Europe. This is precisely what the third scenario stands for. Unlike the disintegrationist 
first, this one imagines a firm commitment to a more social EU, by taking new actions 
and elevating the efforts to reinforce its social dimension in lieu of merely reaffirming 
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what is already there.66 Despite calling for the revaluation of the admittedly limited 
competence regime on social policy together with the extension of the legislative reach 
from setting minimum standards to harmonisation, the Paper underlines the fact that the 
‘centre of gravity for action in the social field should and will always remain with national 
and local authorities and their social partners’.67 This vision allows to draw parallels with 
scholarly views that see a future for Social Europe in tandem with the retention -to 
varying degrees- of national welfare states.68 
It seems that this scenario is the one endorsed by the drafters of the Reflection 
Paper. Its envisioned impact in practice appears much more multi-fold compared to the 
first two, and its pros and cons list contains only two negatives; that of the difficulty to 
reach consensus among the EU 27 and the feeling of detachment some of their citizens 
might feel due to an increase in centralised EU decision-making.69 Furthermore, the third 
scenario explicitly refers to and builds on the Rome Declaration of the EU 27 leaders and 
of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission.70 The 
declaration is among the first since the Brexit Referendum where the UK is absent from. 
According to it, an enhanced Social Europe is among the key agenda items the EU is 
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going to work towards achieving in the next decade.71 Moreover, the vision is also 
supported by the commitment of the Juncker Commission to widen the scope of Europe’s 
social dimension.72 It signals a policy change that should come as the natural consequence 
of a veto player’s departure, according to the pertinent literature.73 
 4. The Proposals for a Stronger Social Dimension of the EU 
This section sets out to examine the elements of the proposed policy change. The viability 
of the third scenario of the Reflection Paper is further boosted by some accompanying 
actions that the EU Institutions have taken recently, signalling a ‘social renaissance’. 
They corroborate the commitment to bolster the social dimension of the Union. The 
timing of the unveiling of these actions, which coincides with the Brexit negotiations and 
with a UK absent from crucial meetings about the EU’s future, cannot help but cement 
the thesis that the country’s intended departure -and its prior role as a veto player- is likely 
to have liberating effects for the EU 27 and Social Europe more specifically. In addition 
to that, Brexit could be just the tip of the iceberg, the final act not closely related to but 
still coming after a series of spirited reactions to a neoliberal European agenda, whose 
adverse effects grew exponentially during the crisis.74 That agenda was also promulgated 
by the CJEU, which has now cautiously started to revise its position.75 Brexit, thence, is 
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what caused the alarm-bell for the future of Social Europe to finally ring and led to more 
concrete actions to be put forward. They are these actions, the recent developments made 
public en masse around the middle of 2017, that spurred euphoria to the proponents of a 
more pronounced EU social dimension and pinpointed to a deeper social integration as 
the way forward for the future without Britain. Or, at least, that is what this ‘social’ 
experiment stands for. 
 4.1 The European Pillar of Social Rights 
The measures that led to the resurgence of attention towards the social dimension of the 
EU were presented together with the Reflection Paper, with much fanfare. These included 
the launch of the consultation processes to address the challenges of access to social 
protection for people in all forms of employment76 and to revise the Written Statement 
Directive (Directive 91/533/EEC),77  the proposal for a work-life balance Directive for 
parents and carers to repeal Council Directive 2010/18/EU78 and the interpretative 
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communication on the implementation of the Working Time Directive.7980 The afore-said 
initiatives were all taken under the aegis of the simultaneously launched European Pillar 
of Social Rights,81 the highlight of them all, which was proclaimed by the triad of the key 
EU institutions during the Gothenburg Social Summit for fair jobs and growth in 
November 2017.82 It being proclaimed so fast shows an allegiance to galvanise the 
discourse towards achieving a more comprehensive EU social dimension. This might 
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subsequently lead to the Pillar gaining Treaty-like status by the next Treaty amendment, 
in a similar way that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU did.83 
 The Pillar, while initially conceived for the Eurozone members, is now addressed 
to all Member States as its preamble 13 states.84 The latter also includes the bases of its 
inception, found in the elusive concept of social market economy embedded in Article 3 
TEU, the horizontal social clause of Article 9 TFEU, the social policy chapter of the 
Treaties together with other closely related provisions such as those on free movement of 
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workers, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.85 Accordingly, and in trying 
to awaken the dormant social side of the European project, the Pillar contains 20 rights 
and principles which are grouped in three Chapters: equal opportunities and access to the 
labour market, fair working conditions, and social protection and inclusion. These rights 
and principles involve a wide spectrum of social policy areas, such as equality, education, 
labour market policies, social dialogue, workers’ rights, health and safety at the 
workplace, social inclusion, care, housing, and social security. It is a comprehensive list 
that aims to call attention to fields of EU policy-making that were left neglected compared 
to economic integration. 
 The Pillar’s key function is to act as stimulus, to push for further and more 
concrete actions to enrich the Union’s social acquis. That is why the rights and principles 
included therein are for the most part not new at EU-level. Instead, they are catalogued 
in the Pillar, complemented by it in a way as to take into account the new social realities, 
in the hope of raising awareness, but most importantly, their ‘actual take-up’.86 The 
chosen way to achieve these aims is through a flexible –predominantly soft law- 
approach, allowing for a melange of methods mainly at the level of the Member States, 
paying due respect to the principle of subsidiarity.87 According to the Pillar, the EU takes 
on a mostly supporting and supervisory role, to lay down the appropriate framework, to 
                                                 
85  Preambles 1 to 6 European Pillar of Social Rights. 
86  European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights’ COM (2017) 250 final 7. 
87  Ibid 2-4. 
 
  
 
 
29 
make sure that the ground is fertile enough for the relevant initiatives to be adopted, and 
to monitor any progress using the Social Scoreboard.88 The EU toolkit, as shown through 
the proposals accompanying the unveiling of the Pillar, may include both legislative and 
non-legislative measures.89 
 4.2 Accompanying measures 
 As said supra, the Pillar was accompanied by a series of legislative and non-
legislative initiatives that aim to reinforce the Union’s renewed interest towards its social 
side. The most tangible and concrete among them was the proposal for a work-life balance 
Directive aimed at both parents and carers, to repeal the Council Directive on parental 
leave (2010/18/EU).90 The proposal was made by the Commission through its power to 
initiate legislation, omitting negotiations with the social partners, as the employers’ side, 
BusinessEurope and UEAPME more specifically, did not support any new legislative 
action in the area.91 Endeavouring to achieve higher levels of work-life balance, gender 
equality and labour market activation for women, to acknowledge the thorny area of 
carers, and to raise the number of men taking up parental leave and flexible working 
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arrangements,92 the proposed Directive guarantees parental leave’s level of pay (Article 
8), introduces a stand-alone paternity leave of 10 days (Article 4) and a carers’ leave of 5 
days a year (Article 6), and expands flexible working arrangements (Article 9). 
 While not ground-breaking and certainly diluted to gather the approval of both 
the Parliament and the Council,93 the proposal for the Directive represents a step forward 
in trying to shape a fairer and more social Europe. This might be easier to materialise 
upon the UK’s departure. Britain’s initial refusal to accept the Agreement on Social 
Policy allowed the first Directive on parental leave (96/34/EC) to be adopted under the 
Agreement without having to stumble upon the UK veto, since the country was excluded 
from its application. The UK’s absence from the negotiating table might also lead to 
stronger provisions making their way to the final version of the Directive, given the 
country’s dismissive attitude, requiring concessions and watered-down proposals, which 
at times did not even manage to guarantee its agreement.94  
 Going back to the measures that accompanied the unveiling of the Pillar, the two 
consultation processes launched in April 2017 to address the challenges of access to social 
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protection for people in all forms of employment and to revise the Written Statement 
Directive (91/533/EEC) bore fruits. The Commission combined them and, by exercising 
its legislative initiative once more, proposed a new Directive on transparent and 
predictable working conditions in December 2017, after seeing no light at the end of the 
tunnel in relation to the involvement of the social partners, faced anew with opposition 
by the employers’ representatives.95  
The Directive aims to tackle new social risks and contemporary challenges of 
industrial relations, by going a step further as regards to the minimum harmonisation of 
social protection of workers in all forms of employment, introducing in Article 2 thereof 
an EU-wide definition of worker emanating from the CJEU case-law. Furthermore, 
Chapter III of the proposed Directive lays down a new set of minimum requirements for 
their working conditions. The draft also includes stringent sanctions and provisions for 
redress, much more thorough than those of the Written Statement Directive. Arguably, if 
these proposals go forward, the revamped Directive, rather neglected in its current form, 
is likely to achieve its Cinderella moment at last.96 
 The UK opposition to the Written Statement Directive was first and foremost 
ideologically driven, Britain already having in its legal system an obligation on employers 
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to issue written statements to employees.97 Nevertheless, given the ongoing ‘colonisation’ 
of labour law through deregulation and re-regulation,98 for Britain to remain competitive 
in the global marketplace,99 it is unlikely that the afore-said proposal would be welcomed 
with open arms, if the UK chose to remain in the EU. To the contrary, introducing 
minimum rights that would affect non-standardised forms of employment, could be seen 
as an attack to the country’s competitive advantage.  
 The rest of the accompanying initiatives either refer to already well-established 
legislative measures, such as the Working Time Directive,100 or concern a soft law 
approach, like the documents on the implementation of the Active Inclusion and Investing 
in Children Recommendations,101 and, thus UK opposition would be implausible. The 
proposed measures are complemented by the new plans under the Commission’s Work 
Programme, also known as the Social Fairness Package, for a European Labour Authority 
and a European Social Security Number, which are currently underway. Apart from a 
supervisory role, ensuring the proper adherence to EU labour and social standards, these 
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developments could lay the seeds for a more institutionalised concept of EU social 
citizenship.  
 
5. Reflections: Will Policy Change Follow? 
5.1. Brexit Britain’s position  
Moving on to the UK side, the consultation phase for the European Pillar of Social Rights 
which preceded all other initiatives occurred simultaneously with the run up to the Brexit 
Referendum in the first half of 2016. The rest of the afore-mentioned initiatives coincided 
with the period following the Referendum’s result. The political reality in post-
referendum Britain inevitably influenced the country’s position apropos of the new social 
developments at EU level. In that regard, the European Scrutiny Committee’s reports are 
quite enlightening. While the first report on the matter does not offer much insight on the 
UK’s position due to its exploratory nature,102 the second one incorporates Brexit into the 
debate. The report underscores its defining character as to how the future relationship 
with the EU is to be shaped, on which the country’s stance towards the EU’s social 
proposals would depend.103 If the UK chooses regulatory convergence or approximation 
for example, some apposite social proposals would merit further exploration. In its third 
report, published in February 2017, the Committee welcomes the UK’s involvement in 
the Pillar, notwithstanding the Leave vote, on the basis of commitments made by the 
                                                 
102  European Scrutiny Committee, Twenty-Ninth Report (HC 2015-16, 342-xxvii) 15-19. 
103  European Scrutiny Committee, Eight Report (HC 2016-17, 71-vi) 31-36. 
 
  
 
 
34 
Prime Minister to maintain most of the European social acquis;104 fast-forward to the end 
of 2017, such guarantees became shaky.105  
In addition to the above, it is also important to look at the evidence submitted by 
the UK Government as a response to the Commission’s consultation on the Pillar. The 
document apart from praising the country’s position as regards its adherence to and 
compliance with the principles and rights set out therein, suggests that no further actions 
by the EU are needed, showcasing once more Britain’s negative stance towards further 
social integration.106 In the Explanatory Memorandum on the White Paper on the Future 
of Europe, the Department for Exiting the European Union switched roles from that of a 
veto player to the one of a leaver, by simply deferring to the EU 27. The same position 
was adopted in relation to some of the Reflection Papers as well, acknowledging that this 
was essentially instigated by Brexit. The developments are a sign of the emancipatory 
effect the UK’s departure might have for European integration; a veto player is no longer 
sitting at the table.  
On the other hand, if the UK reconsidered and chose to remain, it is difficult to 
reconcile the proposed reforms with the categories of objections presented in section 2 of 
this paper. The policies adopted by the Conservative government continue the austerity 
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paradigm and embed the neoliberal underpinnings of the welfare-to-workfare mantra. 
Market-correcting measures such as those proposed come in direct confrontation with 
that, hinting a possible ideological rejection. The party unity rejection could also be 
invoked, given the current state of division within the political elite, and the Eurosceptic 
hysteria by some party members.107 Not only that, but the proclamation of the Pillar and 
the proposals under the Social Fairness Package may as well raise concerns about an 
extension of the EU’s competences without the appropriate treaty reform, bringing the 
external interference rejection into play. Potentially rejecting the proposals on all three 
grounds means that Brexit could avert a catastrophe for the social acquis, given UK’s 
likelihood of veto. 
5.2. Constraints: the other Veto Players. 
Whilst it could plausibly be argued that Brexit would facilitate the realisation of a stronger 
social dimension for Europe, it is not certain that this would be the end result. The 
concretisation of the Pillar and its accompanying initiatives is still at an early stage, and 
it is not certain if, when and to what extent this would materialise. Its cautious approach 
relying heavily on soft law measures, which lack the bite of legislative ones, casts doubts 
on its effectiveness in the long run. This was picked up by the relevant stakeholders, who 
called for more concrete measures in their responses to the Pillar’s consultation phase.108 
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In particular the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) has been critical of the 
overstatement of the social acquis and the alleged improvements to the labour market, the 
lack of linkages to economic integration and the disregard of collective bargaining.109 The 
Pillar being at an early stage shall not be used as an excuse not to evaluate its progress 
and outcomes, as a more comprehensive social agenda should have already been in the 
making.110 
Policy-making under the shadow of the veto threatens not only the coming of an 
EU law into existence, but its actual content as well. Thus, the other Member States, 
smaller veto players of the fringes, may as well substitute the UK in diluting the furthering 
of Social Europe. In such a scenario, a common denominator would need to be sought, 
which is likely to be the lowest one, putting the proposals in danger of being watered 
down in order to become accepted. This is especially relevant to areas where unanimity 
is still required, since compromises are inevitable to occur therein. Yet, without its enfant 
terrible and the polar opposite views that came with it, Social Europe might come a step 
closer to materialising, even through the road of compromises. The ‘socialness’ of the 
final outcomes is likely to be improved post-Brexit.111 The UK departure may not be fully 
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liberating, but, be that as it may, less controversial reforms would more easily move 
forward as their dogmatic opponent would no longer sit at the table.  
 The proposed reforms’ actual content and reach is of paramount importance, in a 
similar way that their take up by the Member States is for the Pillar’s success. The danger 
that lurks with this approach is that even if Britain, the key veto player in EU social 
policy-making, leaves, there will be others that may take up its position, and which have 
been relatively quiet so far. A few years ago, the now abandoned amendments to the 
Directive on maternity leave were rejected not exclusively because of the UK’s 
opposition: it formed a blocking minority together with Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden to achieve this.112 
 The latter was not the only instance where the UK was not the sole Member State 
opposing a social proposal. Examples go as far back as the 1980s, when the harmonisation 
proposals in the areas of employment rights and industrial democracy were blocked by 
the British government, but as Bruun and Hepple note ‘with the active or tacit support of 
some other governments’.113 Indeed hiding behind the UK’s skirt has been a tactic for 
some Member States prior to the 2004 enlargement, with a noted path-dependence of a 
blocking minority consisting of the UK, Denmark, Germany and Ireland on social 
matters, such as the proposals on information and consultation in the event of collective 
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redundancies, or the temporary agency work Directive.114 Following Eastern 
enlargement, the post-socialist Member States have been perceived as forging a ‘market-
making coalition’ with Britain, opposing any market-correcting measure. While Brexit 
might come as shock, their ambition to leave their stamp in EU policy-making, may 
render them the new vocal veto players.115 
 It is, thus, true that while Britain was the most overt of the veto players, and 
perhaps the more consistent opponent of Social Europe, in recent years it was not the sole 
Member State voting down legislative proposals. A study found that during 2009-2015 
in employment and social affairs, Germany was in the minority as often as the UK was 
in the Council of Ministers.116 These changes and the introduction of other players ties 
well with the discussion in the veto player literature of the change in power dynamics 
within the EU institutions with the introduction of QMV and the expansion of the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The literature argues that in an enlarged EU with diverse policy 
interests and an increased role of QMV policy changes will be difficult to materialise, 
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resulting in high levels of policy stability and increasing the role of bureaucracy (the 
Commission) and the Court.117 Voting in the Council has become extremely difficult, and 
it has been advanced that this would likely stall any policy-making going beyond the 
status quo.118 The proposed reforms, in trying to alter the social acquis, might become 
victim of that. Whilst trying to find more Member States to openly oppose a proposal 
might have sounded more difficult in the past, in an EU of 27 this is no longer such an 
arduous task, as the Central and Eastern European countries or the building coalition of 
the New Hanseatic League show. 
 In addition to that, it is not inconceivable that some of the rejection categories 
presented in section 2 could also apply in relation to some of the EU 27. Whilst the 
ideological rejections are in a way more endemic to the liberal British social model,119 
Macron’s proposed welfare cuts in France invites comparison with New Labour’s 
paradigmatic change of social policy narrative. His attitude might also impact the 
country’s stance vis-à-vis the social reforms at EU level. It is indicative for example that 
in the Franco-German Meseberg Declaration of June 2018, social reforms do not get 
much attention whatsoever.120 The second type of rejections, the Eurosceptic and party 
unity ones, can also be triggered by some of the EU 27. Euroscepticism has been diffused 
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in almost all Member States’ party systems, in parties of the left and the right, forging 
competing poles even within a single party.121 As for the last category of fears of external 
interference, countries already in hurdles with the EU, for example Poland, may not 
welcome further reforms on that basis. This would not be the first time Poland exhibits 
such traits, given its ‘opt-out’ from the Charter sitting alongside the British one in 
Protocol 30 thereof. The veto player drama does not seem to have an end in sight; just a 
change of cast.  
The previous remarks are especially important for the enactment of any legislative 
proposal, which is more likely to induce significant policy change. The adoption process 
gives significant negotiating –and consequently veto- power to the Member States. On 
the other hand, in relation to non-legislative or soft law initiatives, such as those included 
in text of the Pillar, other difficulties lie ahead, again, involving the Member States. The 
deferential soft law approach requires persevering commitment for the measures’ full 
potential to be unleashed. Otherwise, it risks becoming a halfway house, a flawed 
mechanism much like the OMC, and lead to a catastrophe similar to that of the Lisbon 
Strategy.122 Even in its proclaimed form the Pillar is largely dependent on the Member 
States’ discretion. Peer pressure is the only effective way under which its principles would 
be acted upon, if legislating is not on the horizon, and it is here where the looming Brexit 
might help, but perhaps not conclusively as this section has shown. 
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6. Conclusion 
The referendum of June 2016 was the first step towards the UK’s departure from the EU, 
following what has been, admittedly, an uneasy relationship over the years. The British 
stance over Social Europe exemplifies the uncomfortable moments of that relationship, 
moments that can be traced back to the early attempts of establishing a formalised social 
dimension for the Union. The successive Conservative governments of Thatcher and 
Major saw any such development as a threat to their neo-liberal worldviews and to 
internal party politics in some instances, perceiving the then Community as a synonym 
of free trade. New Labour’s take over in 1997 saw a change of approach initially, 
endorsing the institutionalisation of certain social policies at EU level, a largely symbolic 
gesture to make amends with the party’s social past. Its position was rescinded a few 
years later, coinciding with its widespread turn to more liberal policies, by securing a new 
opt-out from the Charter, also in fear of external interference. By opposing social 
integration so often, the UK was the key veto player in EU policy-making therein. 
Up until 2016, the UK was known for its opt-outs from Social Europe. The anti-
welfare and Eurosceptic rhetoric of the new Conservative government, wishing to scale 
back on what the UK had already agreed with at EU level social policy-wise, led to a new 
change of circumstances: the ‘Bropt-outs’ are dead, long live Brexit! From a veto player, 
the UK would eventually become a spectator. This, in turn could be a positive 
development for Social Europe, which could finally start getting into full swing, as the 
third scenario of the Commission’s Reflection Paper shows. The latter, in a similar way 
as the White Paper did, contemplates on the challenges the social side of the European 
project is facing in the wake of the Brexit referendum.  Its third scenario advocating for 
a further integrated Social Europe skirts around the dangers of deregulation, a divided EU 
and a race to the bottom, yet it requires strong political commitment in order for its 
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initiatives to be taken up and not to result to EU scapegoating and citizens of other 
Member States demanding to ‘take back control’. It also requires the elimination of all 
opposition by other veto players, something that at present looks unlikely, at least in the 
short term. 
Nevertheless, with Britain gone, a key player advocating against the advancement 
of the social acquis is lost. Moreover, together with the publication of the Reflection 
Paper, which makes it clear that further integration is the most beneficial route for Social 
Europe, the Commission presented its proposals for the European Pillar of Social Rights, 
accompanied by a series of other social initiatives, cementing Juncker’s vow to revive the 
social side of the Union. These developments showcase a commitment, at least on behalf 
of the Commission, towards achieving enhanced social standards EU-wide, which can 
only become more daring now that their familiar foe is no longer at the negotiating table, 
if for nothing else than to test the waters for further integration in the field. A plan for 
policy change has been put on the table, following the veto player’s departure. 
 Consequently, it would be naïve to disregard the potential of the social initiatives 
that have emerged in the wake of the Brexit Referendum. Granted, some, such as the EU 
Pillar of Social Rights were in the making before that, in order to tackle the rising levels 
of dissatisfaction towards the EU in crisis-ridden Member States. However their 
momentum and scope has undoubtedly been revisited post-June 2016. The prospect of 
the British departure acted as a wakeup call, but also liberated the strained EU social 
agenda by opening up room for more far-reaching experiments, such as the proposals for 
the work-life balance and transparent and predictable working conditions for EU workers 
in all forms of employment Directives, or the European Labour Authority. With the 
persistent objector out of the equation, things might finally be able to move forward.  
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 It is still too early to speculate the exact direction the EU would pursue in the 
future, and, for the purposes of this article, to predict with certainty whether the UK’s 
departure would trigger the necessary impetus for further social integration to actually 
meaningfully materialise at EU level. Was the UK the only weight to be taken off in order 
to finally achieve Social Europe? It may be so, but other veto players are still lurking in 
the remaining Member States, particularly in the Central and Eastern European Member 
States, which perceive aspects of social integration burdensome for their 
competitiveness.123 They are also lurking in the collective -institutional- structures, such 
as the European Parliament, following the post-1987 developments as the veto player 
theory suggests. This, coupled with Eurosceptic and deregulatory attitudes elsewhere in 
Europe, on which it is still too soon to evaluate the looming Brexit’s impact, might mean 
that there are still a few obstacles Social Europe has to overcome prior to materialising.  
As for the EU developments, they need to reflect determination and include 
legislative initiatives, not just soft law measures, so that they trigger acceptable 
compliance levels to solidify Social Europe’s position in the European landscape. If the 
afore-mentioned proposals manage to cultivate the right climate and get the majority of 
the Member States on board, then peer pressure in combination with the opposing 
Member States’ less unmalleable –compared to the UK at least- red lines, might allow 
them to be persuaded without weakening the reforms themselves. On a different note, the 
Brexit referendum showed that every so often a significant number of citizens feel 
detached from Europe, something that the national political elites easily take advantage 
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of.124 What better way to welcome them back to the EU then, than by showing that the 
Union cares, through the –long overdue- expansion of its social dimension? 
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